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I. Introduction
In Lawrence v. Texas,1 the United States Supreme Court struck down Texas’s 
sodomy law.  The majority was careful to make clear that it was not deciding whether the 
right to marry a same sex partner was constitutionally protected, instead focusing on the 
criminal aspects of the prohibition at issue.  Justice Scalia implied in dissent that the 
Court had abandoned principled constitutional interpretation and might well eventually 
recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry.  While it is not at all clear that the 
Court will recognize such a right, it is worth noting that the right of same-sex couples to 
marry followed from the existing right-to-marry jurisprudence even before Lawrence was 
decided. Lawrence is important, not because it recognized a right to same-sex marriage, 
but because it overruled a decision which had falsely been thought to be a bar to the right 
to marry a same-sex partner.  This Article will examine Lawrence in light of McLaughlin 
v. Florida,2 Loving v. Virginia,3 and the right to marry jurisprudence more generally, 
concluding that Lawrence makes even clearer that same-sex marriage is protected by the 
United States Constitution, even if the current Court is unlikely to recognize that.
Part II of this Article will examine Lawrence, contrasting it with Bowers v. 
Hardwick,4 and discussing what Lawrence says and does not say about the right to marry 
a same-sex partner.  Pat III discusses the equal protection and due process issues 
implicated by same-sex marriage bans, suggesting that such prohibitions should be struck 
2down on both due process and equal protection grounds.  The Article concludes by 
suggesting that Lawrence is important for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the 
rather startling admission by the dissent that the current constitutional jurisprudence 
requires the recognition of same-sex marriages.  Admission notwithstanding, however, it 
is at best unclear whether this Court will recognize what the Constitution requires in this 
regard or whether, instead, that recognition will not take place until sometime in the 
perhaps distant future.
II. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas,5 the Court examined a statute that criminalized intimate, 
same-sex conduct.6  The statute was challenged as a violation of both equal protection 
and due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,7 and the Court struck it down as a violation of the latter.8 The decision is 
likely to be viewed as a watershed in the movement to secure equal rights for the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) community, although commentators will long 
disagree about what the decision means and why it is important.
A. Lawrence as Response to Bowers v. Hardwick
One way to understand Lawrence v. Texas is to see it as a response to Bowers v. 
Hardwick9 both substantively and symbolically.  Lawrence removes some of the 
underpinnings provided by Hardwick upon which discrimination against the LGBT 
community has been rationalized.  At the same time, it recognizes the dignity of same-sex 
relationships and offers hope that the LGBT community will someday enjoy the same 
rights that others in the United States enjoy.
3At issue in Lawrence was Tex. Penal Code Ann. Sec. 21.06(a), which prohibited 
sexual intercourse between individuals of the same sex involving contact between the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another or the penetration of the genitals 
or the anus of another person with an object.10  The state did not criminalize the same 
activity if performed by members of different sexes.11  Not surprisingly, the statute was 
challenged on both equal protection and due process grounds.12
While the Court ultimately struck down the statute as a violation of Fourteenth  
Amendment due process guarantees,13 the Court seemed to take the equal protection 
challenge seriously as well, describing that argument as “tenable.”14  However, the Court 
believed it very important to address Bowers v. Hardwick15 directly,16 since “[i]ts 
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”17
At issue in Bowers was a Georgia statute which prohibited sexual acts involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.18  The statute did not 
distinguish based on the sexes of the parties involved or on their marital status.19 Indeed, 
the statue was initially challenged by a married couple as well as by Hardwick,20
although the couple was dismissed for lack of standing.21
The statute was challenged as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.22  The Bowers Court understood that an existing line of cases 
protected the right of privacy23 and, further, that some of the right of privacy  cases 
recognized rights that “have little or no textual support in the constitutional language.”24
The Court claimed, however, that it could “identify the nature of the rights qualifying for 
heightened judicial protection,”25 namely, those “liberties that are ‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty not justice would exist if [they] were 
4sacrificed,’”26 or “those liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”27 The Court concluded that because “neither of these formulations would 
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy,” 28
the right to privacy obviously did not include the right to engage in same-sex relations.
Yet, the Court failed to point out that those rig hts already recognized as falling 
within the right to privacy also would not have met the test articulated by the Court.  For 
example, the statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut,29 which prohibited using “any 
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception,”30 had 
been on the books for over eighty years, 31 and thus the right to use contraception could 
not plausibly have been described as either implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.  The statute prohibiting abortion at 
issue in Roe v. Wade32 was typical of statutes that had been on the books for a century33
and thus the right to abort could hardly be thought deeply rooted in the Nation’s history 
and tradition.34 The point here is not to suggest that Griswold and Roe were wrongly 
decided but merely to suggest that the Court offered the wrong test in Bowers for 
determining whether something falls within the right to privacy.
The Bowers Court at least implicitly offered another test for determining whether 
a particular liberty falls within the right to privacy, construing the protected zone as 
involving family-related decisions and then suggesting, “No connection between family, 
marriage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated.”35  The Lawrence Court accepted that family-related decisions are within 
that protected zone, reaffirming that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
5relationships, child rearing and education.”36 However, the Lawrence Court differed 
from the Bowers Court in that the former but not the latter recognized that those with a 
same-sex orientation can and do have relationships worthy of protection.  Indeed, the 
Lawrence Court criticized the Bowers Court by noting that the latter had 
mischaracterized the relevant issue—“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, 
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the 
right to have sexual intercourse.”37 The Lawrence Court noted that “[w]hen sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but 
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,”38 thereby recognizing that those 
with a same-sex orientation like those with a different-sex orientation may not merely 
perform isolated sexual acts but, in addition, have relationships and find meaning, 
purpose, and dignity in those relationships.39
The Lawrence Court outlined some of the pernicious effects of Bowers, 
explaining that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”40 Indeed, the state of Texas 
had itself “previously acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating . . . that 
the law ‘legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways 
unrelated to the criminal law,’ including in the areas of ‘employment, family issues, and 
housing.’”41 As an additional point, the Court noted some of the direct effects of a 
conviction under the statute at issue, which were not trivial by any means.42  For 
example, as Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion, a conviction would 
6restrict the ability of an individual to pursue various professions in Texas and might 
require that individual to register as a sex offender were he or she to move to another 
state.43
In overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court prevents the imposition of some of the 
harms outlined above and undermines the purported justification for others.  Thus, not 
only is there no longer the possibility of a conviction in circumstances like these, but 
those who argue that discrimination against the LGBT community is somehow justified 
because of the permissibility of criminalizing sodomitical relations must now offer
another ground upon which to rationalize their desired discrimination.  
A separate but related point is that individuals who wish to deny equal rights to 
members of the LGBT community will no longer be able to point to the Court’s tone 
when addressing orientation issues as support for denying equal rights.44  Thus, some of 
the harm caused by Bowers was not its substantive holding but its tone, which might 
felicitously be described as having been contemptuous towards those with a same-sex 
orientation.45 The Lawrence Court was respectful rather than contemptuous, 
acknowledging that “adults may choose to enter upon this [same-sex] relationship in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.”46 While hardly offering a full-fledged endorsement, the Court nonetheless 
accords a kind of respectability to LGBT people and relationships that had not been 
accorded in previous decisions.
The Lawrence Court addressed the concern that sodomitical behavior is viewed 
by some as violating religious and moral principles, discussing “powerful voices . . . 
[that] condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.”47  The Court understood that such 
7views were “shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, 
and respect for traditional family,”48 but noted that “the issue is whether the majority may 
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation 
of the criminal law.”49  Concluding that the majority may not, the Court struck down the 
statute.50
Of course, Lawrence has implications for those not in the LGBT community as 
well. By holding that the activity at issue was protected by the Due Process Clause, the 
Lawrence Court is presumably invalidating any fornication statues remaining on the 
books.51  A separate question is whether statutes prohibiting adultery or prostitution are 
also at risk,52 although the majority made clear that the case before it did not involve 
prostitution,53 and offered language suggesting how the case before it might be 
distinguished from one involving adultery.54 Thus, state statues regulating sexual conduct 
may now have to undergo reexamination with some being quite vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge but others being quite likely to withstand an attack on federal 
constitutional grounds.
Further, a more general point might be made about how the Due Process Clause 
may be construed in future.  The Lawrence Court eschewed the Bowers history-and-
traditions approach and instead suggested that “those who drew and ratified the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment [and] the Fourteenth Amendment . . . 
[understood that] times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”55 The Court 
understood that this would mean that challenges which might once have been dismissed 
out of hand by one generation might well be taken seriously by another, and noted that 
8“[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.”56  Here, the Lawrence Court makes clear that it 
rejects the static approach to due process guarantees sometimes advocated and leaves 
open the possibility that a variety of liberties will be found protected which once would 
have been described as appropriately subject to state regulation. 
B. Lawrence and the Right to Marry a Same-Sex Partner
Commentators discussing whether the United States Constitution protects the 
right of same-sex couples to marry will debate both whether and why Lawrence plays an 
important role in that analysis.  Certainly, Justice Scalia suggested in his Lawrence
dissent that the decision provides the basis for recognizing same-sex marriage,57 but there 
are a number of reasons to doubt that the Court is ready to take this step.
Same-sex marriage is mentioned or alluded to in several places in Lawrence.58
However, nowhere in the opinion is there a suggestion that members of the Court believe 
that such a right is protected by the United States Constitution and in several places there 
are suggestions that some members of the Court do not believe that it is.
The majority opinion alludes to same-sex unions but refuses to express an opinion 
about whether they are protected.  For example, the Court noted that the Texas criminal 
statute seeks to “control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal 
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished 
as criminals.”59 Thus, some members of the Court may believe that the Constitution 
precludes criminalizing voluntary, adult, same-sex relations but does not also require that 
same-sex unions be given legal recognition.  Certainly, this seems to be the view which 
9Justice O’Connor now holds,60 and it is simply unclear how many other members of the 
Court share that view.
The Lawrence majority offered a general rule that states should not attempt to set 
boundaries to relationships “absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law 
protects.”61  The Court did not make clear what it had in mind when discussing abuse of 
an institution protected by the law.  Perhaps the Court had marriage in mind and was 
suggesting that adulterous relationships are not protected by the right to privacy because 
they tend to undermine marriages.62 Or, perhaps the Court was suggesting that it believes 
that recognizing same-sex marriage would involve an abuse of the institution of marriage, 
notwithstanding that other countries permit such unions to be celebrated.63
The Lawrence Court made quite clear that the case before it did “not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”64 That said, however, the Court did offer some very 
encouraging language in the opinion.  For example, the Court noted that when 
“homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of 
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public 
and in the private spheres.”65  Yet, the same point might be made about refusing to 
recognize same-sex marriages—such a policy is an invitation to discriminate because it 
says that such couples are somehow unworthy. Indeed, if, as the Court has suggested in 
Romer v. Evans,66 an act is unconstitutional “when it classifies homosexuals not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,”67 and, as 
Justice Scalia suggests in his Lawrence dissent, “‘preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex 
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couples,” then one might expect the Court to recognize the unconstitutionality of same-
sex marriage bans.
In criticizing Bowers, the Lawrence Court noted that the “longstanding criminal 
prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon which the Bowers decision placed such reliance 
is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an 
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.”68 The 
Court thereby tried to undercut the suggestion that the law had traditionally intentionally 
and specifically imposed unique disabilities on the LGBT community, although it might 
nonetheless be said that laws that were aimed at nonprocreative acts generally have been 
used to justify the imposition of special burdens on those with a same-sex orientation.
For example, the law at issue in Bowers was not aimed at those with a same-sex 
orientation in particular69 but its having been upheld was claimed by some to justify 
imposing unique disabilities on the LGBT community.70
It is worth noting that an analogous approach has been used to justify same-sex 
marriage bans.  Thus, the inability of same-sex couples to have a child has been cited as a 
reason not to allow them to marry,71 even though others unable to have children are not 
similarly precluded from marrying.
Lawrence suggests that the Court will look askance at state attempts to impose a 
disability on one group and not another if the groups are similarly situated. As Justice 
Scalia suggests, the nonprocreation argument is not a plausible rationale for precluding 
same-sex couples from marrying, given that the sterile and elderly are allowed to marry.72
Indeed, it is even more implausible than Justice Scalia seems willing to admit.  Given that 
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LGBT couples are having and raising children,73 the procreation argument supports  rather 
than undermines that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
In any event, Lawrence cannot be cited for the proposition that same-sex marriage 
is protected by the United States Constitution.  While some of the language of the opinion 
is promising, the members of the Court have been careful either to express no opinion or 
to suggest that there is no constitutional right to marry a same -sex partner.  It may be 
helpful, then, to see whether a case can be made for a constitutionally protected right to 
marry a same-sex partner, given that Lawrence leaves the question open rather than 
decides the issue.
III.  Same-Sex Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment
The right to marry jurisprudence has been evolving since the Court in Loving v. 
Virginia74 described it as “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men.”75 The Court has recognized the right’s importance, both for 
society as a whole and for the individuals themselves.  At least one question, then, is 
whether the individual and societal interests served by different-sex marriages would also 
be served by same-sex marriages.
A. Setting the Stage for Loving
One of the most important marriage decisions was Loving v. Virginia76 in which 
the Court struck down Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws. The Loving Court suggested 
that the laws at issue  violated both equal protection77 and due process guarantees.78  Yet, 
a mere three years earlier in McLaughlin v. Florida,79 the Court had been unwilling to 
express an opinion about the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans.
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In McLaughlin, the Court examined a Florida statute making interracial
fornication and adultery a separate crime.80  The state justified its law as an attempt to 
“prevent breaches of the basic concept of sexual decency.”81  The Court did not quarrel 
with the state’s contention that it had a legitimate interest in preventing “illicit 
extramarital and premarital promiscuity,”82 but suggested that the state’s purposes could 
be served by statutes of “general application.”83
The state of Florida offered another justification for the statute, however, 
pointing to its interracial marriage ban and arguing that its interracial cohabitation law 
was “ancillary to and serv[ing] the same purpose as the miscegenation law itself.”84  The 
Court rejected this argument “without reaching the question of the validity of the State’s 
prohibition against interracial marriage.”85  The Court noted that “even if we posit the 
constitutionality of the ban against marriage of a Negro and a white, it does not follow 
that the cohabitation law is not to be subjected to independent examination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”86  The Court subjected the cohabitation law to this independent 
examination and found it constitutionally wanting.  
In McLaughlin, the Court did not strike down cohabitation laws generally but 
only those that were specifically directed at interracial couples.  In Lawrence, the Court 
did not only strike down laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy, but struck down all 
sodomy laws.87 It is simply unclear whether the Court will someday follow Lawrence
with a decision striking same-sex marriage prohibitions as the Court followed 
McLaughlin with Loving.
B. The Right to Privacy
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In Lawrence, the Court suggested that Griswold v. Connecticut88 was “the most 
pertinent beginning point”89 for an analysis of the constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy 
law. The Lawrence Court noted that in Griswold a Connecticut law “prohibiting the use 
of drugs or devices of contraception,” even by married couples, was struck down.90  The 
Griswold Court had “described the protected interest as a right to privacy and placed 
emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”91  Of 
course, relying on marital privacy would not seem to be of much help for those 
challenging Texas’s sodomy statute, given that the statute only applied to non-marital 
relations.92  However, the Lawrence Court suggested that “[a]fter Griswold, it was 
established that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends 
beyond the marital relationship.”93  The Court was apparently reading Eisenstadt v. 
Baird94 as protecting not only the right of unmarried individuals to have access to 
contraception but also to engage in sexual relations,95 at least if the individuals are adult 
and their relations are consensual.96
Commentators may well express surprise that Justice Scalia did not focus more on 
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold in which he wrote that “it should be said of 
the Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of 
sexual promiscuity or misconduct,”97 and in which he and two other members of the 
Court98 cited Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman99 with approval.100  In his Poe
dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the “right of privacy most manifestly is not an 
absolute.  Thus, I would not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest 
are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.”101
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Yet, there may well be a reason that Justice Scalia did not focus on the Griswold
concurrence and Poe dissent, as may become clear when Justice Harlan’s analysis is 
discussed more fully.  Justice Harlan suggested that the 
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may 
be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and 
brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and 
homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, 
confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed 
into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this 
area must build upon that basis. 102
Here, it is clear that Justice Harlan was envisioning a world in which same-sex 
relations did not occur within the context of a family setting but, instead, outside of one. 
Whether or not that was an accurate picture at the time, however, it certainly is not 
currently, given how much the concept of family has expanded over the past several 
decades.  Same-sex couples are now living together as families.103  Sometimes they have 
children that they are raising and sometimes they do not, but it simply is not true that 
same-sex relations must take place outside of families rather than within them. If the 
family setting is what is paradigmatic of what is protected by the Due Process Clause, 
that LGBT families should also be protected.
A further point might be noted.  Justice Harlan suggested that the constitutional 
doctrine which provides bulwarks against state interference must begin with the family.  
That does not suggest that the constitutional doctrine must end there.  Rather, what is 
suggested is that a prioritization has been offered.  Family relationships must be protected 
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even if sexual activity by those not within a family is not.  However, that hardly means 
that the latter cannot or should not also be protected.
The Lawrence Court noted, “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring.”104 Here, the Court recognizes that same-sex relations may take place 
within the context of a relationship, and implies that such relationships are included 
within the family relationships that must be given protection under the Due Process 
Clause.
In his Poe dissent, Justice Harlan distinguished between the State’s “power either 
to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry” and the State’s 
power “when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it 
undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.”105 Yet, 
it is not as if the state has absolute discretion with respect to regulating who may marry 
whom.  As the Loving Court made clear a mere six years later, state marital restrictions 
must not violate constitutional guarantees.
It might be thought that Loving does very little to limit the power of the states to 
decide who can marry and that the states have free reign in this regard as long as they do 
not classify on the basis of race.  Such a view has not been borne out in the subsequent 
jurisprudence.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,106 the Court examined a Wisconsin statute which 
precluded certain Wisconsin residents from marrying without court permission.107 The 
courts were directed not to permit noncustodial parents to marry unless they could show 
that they were meeting and would continue to meet their child support obligations.108 The 
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statute was challenged by Redhail, an indigent who wished to marry but who was unable 
to pay court-ordered support for a child that he had fathered out of wedlock.109
The Zablocki Court noted that the “leading decision of this court on the right to 
marry is Loving v. Virginia,”110 and explained, “Although Loving arose in the context of 
racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right 
to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”111 The Court did not limit the 
class for whom this right was so fundamental by excluding, e.g, those either unwilling or 
unable to have children or those with a same-sex orientation, but said that it was 
important for everyone.  Indeed, Justice Powell in his Zablocki concurrence suggested 
that the decision would have implications for those with a same-sex orientation.112
The Zablocki Court did not merely announce that the “right to marry is part of the 
fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause,”113 but instead tried to explain why that was so by putting it in the context of 
those rights which had already been recognized as falling within the right to privacy.  The 
Court noted, “It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same 
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and 
family relationships,”114 since “it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy 
with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter 
the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”115  While accepting
that Wisconsin had “legitimate and substantial interests” which were served by the 
statute,116 the Court nonetheless struck down the statute because “the means selected by 
the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry.”117
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Zablocki would seem to be very persuasive if not dispositive in the context under 
discussion here, given that LGBT couples are having and raising children. If, as Zablocki
suggests, it makes little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters 
of family life but not to marriage, then it makes no sense to refuse to recognize the right 
of same-sex couples to marry.
In Adams v. Howerton,118 a federal district court addressed the validity of a same-
sex marriage between an American and an Australian national.  In holding that the 
marriage was invalid, the court discussed the equal protection challenge, given that 
marriages were “sanctioned between couples who are sterile because of age or physical 
infirmity, and between couples who make clear that they have chosen not to have 
children.”119  The Adams court explained that “if the classification of the group who may 
validly marry is overinclusive, it does not affect the validity of the classification.”120 Yet, 
the court failed to understand that this is one of the reasons that same-same marriages 
must be recognized regardless of whether a particular same-sex couple plans to have or 
raise children. Even were it true that the sole reason to permit members of a class to 
marry was to enable them to provide a more stable environment in which children might 
be born and raised, that still would provide justification for recognizing same-sex 
marriages.  The fact that there are numerous reasons to recognize marriages, which are 
equally applicable to same- and to different-sex couples, e.g., to make happier and more 
productive citizens or to relieve financial burdens on the state, makes the equal protection 
difficulties posed by same-sex marriage bans all the more glaring.
In Turner v. Safley,121 the Court discussed some of the constitutionally significant 
interests implicated in marriage.  Marriages are “expressions of emotional support and 
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public commitment.”122 Further, “the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of 
religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication.”123 Finally, marriage 
“often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits.”124 Given that all of these 
interests are also implicated for same-sex couples125 and the right to marry is of 
fundamental importance for all individuals, the right to marry a same-sex partner should 
be held to be constitutionally protected even bracketing Lawrence.
Lawrence does add something to the debate, however. If, as suggested in Bowers
and reaffirmed by Lawrence, the central focus of the substantive due process protections 
involve family-related matters like marriage, having and raising children, etc., then one 
would expect that if sexual relations for different-sex and same-sex couples are protected 
even when occurring outside of the family context, then families involving same-sex 
partners should certainly be protected.  It may be that Justice Scalia did not want to point 
to the prioritization which has been adopted by the Court precisely because this would 
mean that the existing jurisprudence protects same-sex marriage, especially after 
Lawrence.  Thus, the claim would not be that same-sex marriage might be recognized 
because the Court has given up all reasoning but that the Court’s previous jurisprudence 
compels the legal recognition of such unions.  Indeed, Justice Scalia admits as much 
when he suggests that after Lawrence no distinction can “be made between heterosexual 
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”126
While Justice Scalia is correct that after Lawrence there is no constitutionally 
viable distinction between the right to marry a same- versus a different-sex partner, he is 
incorrect insofar as he is implying that there was a constitutionally viable distinction 
before Lawrence.127  Even were the state permitted to criminalize sodomy outside of 
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marriage, that would not imply that it could criminalize sodomy within marriage.128 Thus, 
even were Bowers still good law, that would not imply that a same-sex couple who had 
married could be prohibited from engaging in sexual relations. Nor would it mean that 
the state could prevent same-sex couples from marrying to prevent them from engaging 
in “criminal” sodomitical acts.  Nonetheless, now that Bowers has been overruled, those
specious arguments are no longer even tempting to make.
C. Equal Protection
The argument above is focused on the substantive due process protections offered 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. A separate question is whether same-sex marriage bans 
violate equal protection guarantees.  The comments offered by Justices O’Connor and 
Scalia in Lawrence suggest that at least four members of the Court are unlikely to accept 
the equal protection argument,129 although these comments also suggest that the Court is 
going to have to modify its equal protection jurisprudence in order to avoid striking down 
same-sex marriage bans on that basis.
Justice O’Connor made clear in her concurrence that she would have struck down 
the Texas statue on equal protection rather than substantive due process grounds.130 She 
suggests that rational basis review itself has tiers. Because “some objectives, such as ‘a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,’ are not legitimate state 
interests,”131 the Court will apply “a more searching form of rational basis review to 
strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”132 Because of this more 
searching form of rational basis review, the Texas statute could not pass constitutional 
muster.
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Justice O’Connor was unwilling to join the Court in overruling Bowers.133 She 
suggested that the promotion of morality was a rational basis for law for substantive due 
process purposes,134 even if not for equal protection purposes.  She explained, “Moral 
disapproval of this group [those with a same-sex orientation], like a bare desire to harm 
the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy the rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”135 She thus would have struck down the Texas statute but 
would have reserved for another day whether the Due Process Clause precluded a neutral 
sodomy law.136
Justice O’Connor recognized that the Texas sodomy statute criminalized conduct 
and thus might be argued not to have been discriminating against persons.137 However, 
she reasoned that the statute was “directed toward gay persons as a class”138 and thus was 
unconstitutional.139  Justice O’Connor made clear, however, that she would view a 
challenge to same-sex marriage statutes somewhat differently. She suggested that 
“[u]nlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state interest in this 
case—other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond moral 
disapproval of an excluded group.”140  Justice O’Connor failed to elaborate what those 
reasons might be, and the question to be answered at some future time is whether, as 
Justice Scalia suggests, “‘preserving the traditional institution of marriage’ is just a 
kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”141  If 
Justice Scalia is correct, then it may well be very difficult indeed to provide any 
legitimate rationale for same-sex marriage bans.
At least two points might be made about Justice O’Connor’s apparent willingness 
to uphold same-sex marriage bans. First, the Wisconsin statute at issue in Zablocki was 
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struck down on equal protection grounds.142  There, the state had legitimate and 
substantial reasons for its statute,143 which nonetheless did not suffice to save it. The class 
of individuals adversely affected by the statute—the indigent—was not suspect or quasi-
suspect.144 Thus, even if the state were to have a legitimate reason for its same-sex 
marriage ban which was not simply the wish to express its moral disapproval of same-sex 
couples, it is not at all cle ar that the reason would allow the statute to pass constitutional 
muster, given the existing jurisprudence.
Second, it is not at all clear that rational basis would be the appropriate test when 
examining this equal protection challenge.   Justice Scalia’s comments in his Lawrence
dissent are suggestive of why this is so, especially once his misleading analysis of Loving
is explained and a more accurate analysis is considered in its stead.
Justice Scalia recognized in his Lawrence dissent that the Texas “statute does 
distinguish between the sexes insofar as concerns the partner with whom the sexual acts 
are performed: men can violate the law only with other men, and women only with other 
women.”145  However, he concluded, “this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, 
since its is precisely the same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws 
prohibiting marriage with someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with 
someone of the opposite sex.”146
Let us bracket his conclusion about whether the Texas statute passes muster under 
the Equal Protection Clause, especially since a majority of the Court seems to believe that 
it failed to pass muster even under the rational basis test.147  Let us also bracket his 
conclusory statement about whether same-sex marriage bans pass constitutional muster, 
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since that is the matter at issue, and examine why he believes that heightened scrutiny 
would not be required when examining the constitutionality of such statutes.
Justice Scalia realizes that both the Texas sodomy statute and same-sex marriage 
bans148 facially discriminate on the basis of sex, but argues that heightened scrutiny is not 
necessary for either.  He understands that the antimiscegenation laws at issue in Loving v. 
Virginia149 would seem to be a clear counter-example to his analysis of whether same-sex 
marriage bans trigger heightened scrutiny, since the laws at issue in Loving “similarly 
were applicable to whites and black alike, and only distinguished between the races 
insofar as the partner was concerned.”150 However, he argues, the Court in Loving
“correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather than the usual rational-basis review, 
because the Virginia statute was ‘designed to maintain White Supremacy.’”151
Certainly, he is correct that the Loving Court found that the statutes at issue were 
designed to promote White Supremacy.152  However, the important issues are whether 
closer scrutiny was required to discover this invidious motivation and what would have 
happened had there been no such finding.
Consider the analysis offered by the Court in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson 
Co.153 The Court explained, “Absent searching inquiry into . . . race-base measures, there 
is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what 
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple 
racial politics.”154 While some members of the Court have argued convincingly that it is 
sometimes possible to distinguish between benign and malicious discrimination,155 the 
discrimination at issue in Loving and, for that matter, at issue in same-sex marriage bans 
can hardly be characterized as benign and, in any event, one would not expect Justice 
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Scalia to rely on the purpose of the discriminator when deciding whether exacting
scrutiny should be employed for a racial classification.156
Justice Scalia’s analysis is even more misleading because he mischaracterizes the 
Loving decision itself.  The Loving Court made clear that even had there been no purpose
to promote White Supremacy, the antimiscegenation statutes still would have been struck 
down.157 Further, even had the Loving Court not expressed this explicitly, the 
jurisprudence as it has since developed requires that “all racial classifications, imposed 
by whatever federal, state, or local actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny.”158
The lesson of Loving is not that racial classifications will be examined closely 
only when they are designed to promote White Supremacy, but that racial classifications 
will be examined closely to root out invidious discrimination.  Indeed, the Court had 
already made that lesson clear.  In McLaughlin v. Florida,159 there was no showing that 
the state was trying to promote the superiority of one race over another, and the Court 
nonetheless struck down the statute expressly classifying on the basis of race.160  The 
McLaughlin Court made quite clear that “[j]udicial inquiry under the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . does not end with a showing of equal application among the members of the 
class defined by the legislation.”161 Rather, the “courts must reach and determine the 
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its 
purpose.”162
The claim here is not that marriage statutes which expressly classify on the basis 
of sex will be treated in the same way as will statutes that expressly classify on the basis 
of race. The former classifications are subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than are the 
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latter.163 Nonetheless, the claims are that sex-based classifications should not be 
subjected to a rational basis test and that, as Justice Scalia suggests in his Lawrence
dissent, same-sex marriage bans involve sex-based classifications.
Perhaps the Court will ultimately find that same-sex marriage bans pass 
constitutional muster.  However, unless the Court is going to modify its current 
jurisprudence,164 Justice Scalia is incorrect that a statute disadvantaging same-sex couples 
which expressly classifies on the basis of sex does “not need to be justified by anything 
more than a rational basis, which . . . is satisfied by the enforcement of traditional notions 
of sexual morality.”165 Rather than pass the rational basis test, which merely requires that 
the “classification drawn by the statute . . . [be] rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest,”166 such a classification must “serve important government objectives and . . . 
the discriminatory means employed . . . [must be] substantially related to the achievement 
of those objectives.’” 167
To establish the constitutionality of a sex-based classification, it will not suffice 
merely to establish that the classification was not motivated out of animus towards one 
sex or the other.  As the Court made clear in United States v. Virginia,168 “a party seeking 
to uphold government action based on sex must establish an exceedingly persuasive 
justification’ for the classification.”169  Indeed, the classification at issue in Virginia
which, arguably, was not motivated by animus,170 was nonetheless held not to pass 
constitutional muster.171
It is unclear whether same-sex marriage bans could survive heightened scrutiny.  
However, it might be noted that the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State172 was 
employing a scrutiny less exacting than heightened scrutiny173 and the Baker court 
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nonetheless held that the state constitution’s analog of equal protection guarantees174 had 
been violated by the state’s refusal to accord (qualifying) same-sex couples the benefits 
accorded to married couples.175 It is at best unlikely that same-sex marriage bans could 
withstand heightened scrutiny.
IV. Conclusion
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia suggests that the Lawrence opinion “‘does 
not involve’ homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic 
have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”176 It is worth thinking about why 
Justice Scalia believes that Lawrence “involves” same-sex marriage when the Texas 
statute challenged was Tex. Penal Code Ann. Sec. 21.06(a)177 rather than Tex. Family 
Code sec. 2.001.178
A. Lawrence and the Pre-existing Priorities in Due Process Jurisprudence
Lawrence is important to consider for a number of reasons.  It strikes down 
sodomy laws generally, which not only precludes states from criminalizing adult, 
voluntary, same-sex relations but also has important implications if the Court is going to 
adhere to the priorities that it has already articulated as being important in substantive due 
process jurisprudence.  The Court has already made clear that relationships are privileged 
over relations and that family matters are at the core of what is protected by substantive 
due process guarantees.  If the right to engage in same-sex and different-sex non-marital 
relations is protected, then certainly the right to have one’s family relationships not 
impinged upon by the state is also protected, whether or not one is a member of the 
LGBT community.  This protection not only extends to one’s children but to one’s life 
partner as well.  If the previous jurisprudence is not suddenly going to undergo 
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transformation, then Lawrence suggests that the right to marry a same-sex partner is 
protected by substantive due process guarantees.
B. Lawrence as Representing an Evolution in Attitude
As a separate but related point, Lawrence represents a significant change in tone.  
Romer v. Evans179 was an improvement over Bowers, because Romer struck down an 
amendment which disfavorably classified those with a same-sex orientation “not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.”180 The 
Romer Court made clear that it “is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of 
this sort.”181
Yet, Romer was ambiguous in that it was difficult to determine whether the 
amendment was unconstitutional precisely because “its sheer breadth [was] so 
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed] inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class it affect[ed].”182  Were that the amendment’s
fatal flaw, then one might expect that the electorate could have achieved a similar result if 
only it had been more patient and had adopted a piecemeal approach rather than tried to 
do everything in one fell swoop.183 If that was all that Romer stood for, then it would not 
be particularly supportive of the LGBT community except, perhaps, as a statement that it 
is impermissible for the state to make members of the LGBT community into pariahs.184
Lawrence does not lend itself to the same kind of minimalist interpretation.  
While the Court is mysterious about what it will say with respect to the constitutionality 
of same-sex marriage bans, its tone of acceptance of and respect for members of the 
LGBT community seems hard to mistake.  That change in tone is important if only 
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because it indicates that the Court no longer believes that LGBT individuals are second-
class citizens deserving less protection than other United States citizens.  
C. Lawrence as Laying Bare the Invidiousness of Bowers
The Lawrence Court implied that Bowers had invidious effects.185 Yet, the 
Lawrence dissent suggests something much stronger.  Apparently, some members of the 
Court have taken Bowers to hold as a matter of law that second-class status may be 
imposed upon an entire group because of moral disapproval of that group.  This casts a 
whole new light on the majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers, Romer, and 
Lawrence.
In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun suggested, “Unlike the Court, the 
Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so 
different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in ways that would not be 
tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens.”186  One might have thought that 
Justice Blackmun was engaging in rhetorical exaggeration.  While the Bowers Court had  
held that same-sex sodomy did not implicate a right deeply rooted in the Nation’s history 
and tradition187 and hence was not protected by the Due Process Clause, the same 
analysis applied equally to different-sex sodomy188 as well as adultery, fornication, and a 
host of other activities.189  Thus, the decision, although disappointing and arguably 
wrong, 190 need not have been doing anything invidious.  
Certainly, lack of invidiousness does not excuse the Court’s having offered a 
cramped191 and willfully blind192 reading of the case, the issue before it, and the past 
jurisprudence, thereby having created an arbitrary limit on the reach of substantive due 
process guarantees which undercut the Nation’s long-cherished values.193 Nonetheless, 
28
such a result, although deeply regrettable, is hardly the equivalent of a holding that those 
with a same-sex orientation can be “singled out for disfavorable treatment.”194
Yet, Justice Blackmun may not have been engaging in rhetorical exuberance after 
all.  To see that, i t is important to consider Romer  and then Lawrence.  
Romer v. Evans195 might seem to be a surprising case to discuss when seeking to 
get the “proper” interpretation of Bowers.  At issue in Romer was an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2) which precluded those with a same-sex 
orientation from receiving protected status.196 The Colorado Supreme Court had struck 
down the amendment on electoral process grounds,197 and the Romer Court affirmed but 
on different grounds,198 namely, that the amendment violated  equal protection 
guarantees.199
Of interest here is not whether the amendment should have been struck down as a 
violation of equal protection or, instead, electoral process guarantees200 but, rather, on 
why Justice Scalia argued that the case “most relevant” to the issue before the Romer
Court was Bowers.201 After all, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, Colorado had 
repealed its sodomy law.202 Yet, according to  Justice Scalia, the fact of the repeal was 
irrelevant, since if “it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual 
conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact laws merely 
disfavoring homosexual conduct.”203  What kind of laws?  Those precluding the 
extension of protected status or, presumably, those precluding marriage.204
To see how breathtaking this view is, consider adultery, a practice that is likely 
not protected even after Lawrence.205  Consider further that, unlike its action with respect 
to sodomy, the Colorado Legislature has not repealed its statute prohibiting adultery.206
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One would expect that Justice Scalia would suggest that heavy civil penalties could be 
imposed on adulterers or even on those who had an adulterous “orientation,”207 e.g., those 
married individuals who would kiss or embrace a non-spouse or, perhaps, who had a 
“tendency or desire to do so.”208 An individual burdened by such a statute might bring an 
as-applied challenge to establish that he or she had never engaged in adulterous behavior 
but the statute itself, allegedly, would pass constitutional muster.209
Let us focus on a particular possible civil penalty, namely, not being able to 
marry.  Not so long ago, adulterers were precluded from marrying their paramours210 or, 
sometimes, marrying at all.211 Yet, very few if any jurists and commentators in this day 
and age would suggest that a state could constitutionally preclude adulterers, much less 
those with an adulterous orientation, from remarrying.  After all, the Zablocki Court 
struck down the Wisconsin statute at issue precisely because it absolutely prevented some 
from marrying and in effect coerced others into forgoing their right to marry.212  Yet, 
Justice Scalia’s Romer and Bowers analyses would imply that adulterers could be 
precluded from marrying or remarrying.
Suppose that we apply Justice Scalia’s approach to a different class of individuals, 
namely, those who are fornicators or who have an “orientation” to fornicate. Presumably, 
Justice Scalia would suggest that it is within the power of the state to preclude fornicators 
from marrying.  Those with such an orientation would be allowed to marry if successful 
in their as-applied challenge, but the statute itself could withstand constitutional scrutiny.  
Basically, this statute would impose possibly severe213 penalties on those unwilling to 
delay having sexual relations until after marriage, and Justice Scalia would suggest that 
such matters are best left to the wisdom of the Legislature.
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Consider how the Lawrence dissenters might address a case, Rablocki v. Zedhail,
involving facts similar to those of Zablocki.  Justice Scalia would point out that Zedhail 
had had a child out of wedlock.214 He would note that while Wisconsin does not have a 
law against fornication per se,215 it could have such a law without offending the 
Constitution, because fornication is neither implicit in the concept of ordered liberty nor a 
right which is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.  Justice Scalia would 
further point out that in Wisconsin the failure to pay child support can result in a felony 
conviction.216 He would then suggest that if “it is constitutional to make . . . conduct 
[involving nonsupport] criminal, then surely it is constitutionally permissible for a state 
to enact other laws merely disfavoring . . . conduct [involving nonsupport].”217 He would 
conclude that Wisconsin could preclude Redhail from marrying, past jurisprudence to the 
contrary notwithstanding.  Justice Rehnquist would either join Justice Scalia’s opinion or 
would write a separate one suggesting that the right to marry is not the sort of right which 
invariably triggers strict scrutiny.218  Justice Thomas might join either of those opinions 
or, perhaps, write his own in which he not only rejected the fundamental right to marry 
but that there is a general right to privacy.219
Needless to say, these views are not in accord with the current right-to-marry 
jurisprudence.  Certainly, that jurisprudence does not require the Court to  strike down any 
and all restrictions on marriage.  As the Court made clear in Zablocki, “reasonable 
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”220 For example, in Sosna v. Iowa,221 the 
Court upheld Iowa’s one-year residency requirement for divorce.222 However, that was
precisely because the statute at issue did not deprive the appellant of the right to marry 
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but merely delayed its exercise.223 Here, we are postulating a complete deprivation of the 
right to marry.  The current jurisprudence simply does not permit the deprivation of that 
right unless the statute at issue “is supported by sufficiently important state interests and 
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”224
There are two distinct issues which must not be conflated.  One involves the 
refusal of the Lawrence dissenters to accept or apply current privacy or right-to-marry 
jurisprudence.  Another involves their apparent belief that Bowers permits same-sex 
marriage bans in particular because , allegedly, Bowers stands for the proposition that 
those with a same-sex orientation can be singled out for disfavorable treatment,225
notwithstanding the explicit disavowal in Bowers that equal protection issues were even 
being addressed.226
It should be little wonder that Justice Scalia suggested in his Romer dissent that 
the amendment at issue was merely “a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans 
to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority 
to revise those mores through use of its laws.”227 On his view, Bowers made it 
permissible for the states to impose any of a number of disabilities on members of the 
LGBT community and Colorado had not chosen to exercise that power as fully as it 
might have.  
When the Romer Court suggested that a state cannot “deem a class of persons a 
stranger to its laws,”228 it seems to have been rejecting a view that the Lawrence and 
Romer dissenters actually hold, namely, that Bowers permits a kind of open season on 
members of the LGBT community.229  The Romer and Lawrence dissenters should be 
commended for their forthrightness. They do not merely suggest with a wink and a nod 
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that a neutral law might slyly be applied in a way that would disadvantage a particular 
group without running afoul of Yick Wo limitations.230  Rather the Romer dissent boldly 
argues that Bowers permits members of the LGBT community to be singled out for 
disfavorable treatment and the Lawrence dissent implies that discrimination against the 
LGBT community in particular is legitimate and a constitutional right.231  Rather than
engaging in rhetorical exaggeration, the Bowers dissents and the Romer and Lawrence
majority decisions almost understate the view that they are opposing.  If that opposing 
view is not invidious, it seems difficult to imagine what would qualify. 
D. Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage
Even before Lawrence, the constitutionally significant interests established in the  
right-to marry jurisprudence were equally applicable to same-sex and different-sex 
couples.  Both types of couples may have children to raise, and may consider marriage as 
an expression of emotional support, public commitment, and religious faith.  Some 
commentators would explain the apparent anomaly in the failure to recognize the 
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans by talking about a “gay exception,”232
while others would simply claim that this is a refusal to accord same-sex couples “special 
rights.”233  In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia helps to settle that debate.  Basically, 
he suggests in his Romer dissent and, more explicitly, in his Lawrence dissent that same-
sex marriages are constitutionally protected, not if members of the LGBT community are 
accorded special rights, but simply if they are accorded the same rights as everyone else.  
Apparently, Justice Scalia’s complaint is that by overruling Bowers and thereby making 
clear that the LGBT community cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the 
Lawrence Court makes it impossible to offer a constitutionally viable argument justifying 
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same-sex marriage bans.  Of course, neither the Lawrence majority nor the Lawrence
concurrence believe that the Constitution permits states to create the kind of second-class 
citizenship which three members of the Court apparently believe would pass 
constitutional muster, and it remains to be seen what implications, if any, this newly 
announced equality will have.
The Lawrence majority recognized that “times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.”234 It is simply unclear whether the current Court can recognize what Justice 
Scalia and two other members of the Court admit—the current equal protection and due 
process jurisprudence require the recognition of same-sex marriage.  We shall simply 
have to wait and see how many generations of Supreme Court Justices are required
before the Court can see that same-sex marriage bans are neither necessary nor proper but 
in fact serve only to oppress.
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